Abstract. The paper presents a novel approach t o J a v a b yte code veri cation: The veri cation process is performed o ine" on a network server, instead of incorporating it in the client. Furthermore, the most critical part of the veri cation process is based upon a formal model and uses a model checker for checking the veri cation conditions. The result of the veri cation process can be securely communicated to the runtime platform with cryptographic means. The major advantages of our approach are twofold: on the one hand, it o ers a higher degree of security, since the veri cation process is based on a formal framework. Secondly, i t s a v es resources on the client's side, since the process of byte code veri cation can be replaced by a simple check of a digital signature. This paper concentrates on Java smart cards, where resource limitations inhibit fully-edged byte code veri cation within the client, but the demand for security i s v ery high. However, our approach can also be applied to other variants of Java.
to con gure the function of clients in a network as needed; the expensive process of installing software on clients becomes super uous.
The technical basis for both these speci cs of Java h a v e been known in computer science since decades. However, the overall design of the
Fig. 1. Java's Architecture
Java scenario is very promising, and the technology became widely accepted and available on various platforms. This makes Java i n teresting.
A potential hindrance for the wide-spread use of Java are security concerns. The problem is, essentially, that down-loading executable code from an open network can be dangerous, since it is hard to ensure that such an executable actually does not do any harm to the local system. Java's answer to this problem is, in essence, a t ype-safe language, a byte code veri er that checks certain safety properties of the transferred executable code, and a sandbox model that restricts the runtime environment of the down-loaded code. The Java byte code veri er plays a crucial role in this architecture cf Figure 1 : implemented within the user's Java platform, it ensures that the byte code to be executed meets certain properties like t ype-safety. The sandbox that runs Java applets takes these properties for granted, mainly for reasons of eciency. Without this veri cation step, malicious byte code e.g. code that In this paper we describe a novel security architecture for Java, where the process of byte code veri cation is carried out using a model checker; this process is assumed to be implemented o ine", i.e. on a server in a network and not within the client. The result of such a v eri cation step can be communicated to a client, e.g. by applying digital signatures to Java b yte code programs applets.
Our approach has two major advantages: rstly, it o ers a strong formal basis for an operation that is crucial to security. This helps avoiding bugs in the byte code veri er that can cause security holes. Secondly, the principle of carrying out the byte code veri cation o ine o ers much more exibility than the current approach, since it does not su er from resource restrictions usually found within the clients, both for size and speed of the Java runtime platform.
The major motivation for our research w ere the speci cs of Java smart cards Sun97a, Sun97b, KP98 , where byte code veri cation is particularly problematic because of the extreme space and runtime limitations of smart cards processors. The concept of o ine veri cation ts perfectly into this scenario: it saves resources on the card, and formal approaches like model checking can increase security, which is highly desirable for smart card applications.
Whilst the advantages of our approach are most obvious in the case of smart cards, the approach itself can also be carried forward to the general framework of Java.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next Section 2 we discuss the role of byte code veri cation within Java's security architecture. Section 3 outlines the idea behind performing byte code veri cation o ine and compares it with the current architecture. In Section 4 we i n troduce the use of model checking for the semantic checks of Java's byte code veri cation, Section 5 gives a detailed example. Finally, w e discuss related research in Section 6 and draw conclusions from our work in 7.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the basics of model checking EC82 , some familiarity with Java's security architecture Yel95, L Y96 and Java b yte code LY96 is also helpful for the understanding of this paper.
Java Byte Code Veri cation
The Java runtime system loads classes from class les, which are often fetched over a network on demand. For each newly loaded class, its class le is checked by the class le veri er, part of which is the byte code veri er.
The checks performed can be roughly divided into mainly syntactic and mainly semantic checks. Examples of syntactic checks are verifying the correct syntactic format of the class le, the length of attributes, the correct declaration of the class, its elds and methods, etc. Since these syntactic checks are comparably simple and not of particular interest for the sequel of this paper, we will not elaborate on them. We will concentrate on the semantic checks of the veri er, in particular, we will show in Section 4 how these can be implemented using a model checker.
Semantic Checks of the Java Byte Code Veri er
The byte code veri er ensures that the byte code itself, which implements Java methods, is legal", i.e. it follows certain rules. A detailed, though informal description of what this is supposed to mean can be found in Yel95, L Y96 . 1 Essentially, the idea behind byte code veri cation is to ensure that the byte code 1 From a rigorous point of view one can argue that the byte code veri er does in fact not perform a veri cation step: veri cation as an isolated notion does not make sense, instead one can only verify something against a speci cation. If such a speci cation is not explicitly given, the notion of veri cation" is at least from a formal point o f view misleading.
has been generated by a conformant compiler, thus observing several implicit rules. The Java i n terpreter within the client takes conformance of the byte code to these rules for granted, mainly for reasons of e ciency. Therefore, byte code veri cation is essential for Java security since it is not obvious that the byte code always conforms to these rules: it could have been manipulated or an attacker could even have written malicious byte code by hand for crashing the Java interpreter.
The semantic checks in the byte code veri cation process form the most complex part of the class le veri cation. In particular, a data ow analysis of each method is carried out, which is is closely related to the Java t ype system: Starting with the rst instruction of a method, the e ect of that instruction to the operand stack and to local variables is computed. This computation does not consider particular values of elds or variables but their type information, only. The state reached thereby is taken as a precondition for the following instructions. Subsequently, such a simulation is applied to all instructions of a method.
For secure execution, several conditions must hold for each instruction, depending on the type of instruction:
For each instruction, an appropriate number of parameters must be on the operand stack, local variables must have appropriate types, and there must be enough room on the stack for storing the results of the instruction.
If an instruction can be reached by di erent execution paths, the values of the operand stack and the local variables must have compatible types in all these paths. Each method of an object that is called must have been initialised by certain initialisation methods, and the type returned by a method must match its declaration. Jumps to invalid instructions are forbidden, and execution must not go beyond the last byte of the code. Additionally, there are certain restrictions on how the instructions for subroutines may be used. Subroutines are among other things used for implementing try finally constructs in the Java language LY96 . In summary, a b yte code program that meets these criteria is supposed to be safe and not capable of breaking" the virtual machine. A program which fails to meet one of these criteria is refused since its safe execution can not be guaranteed, and it might lead to gaining unauthorised access to resources on the client b y crashing the Java i n terpreter.
Problems of the Current Approach
We see several disadvantages of the byte code veri er and the current security architecture of Java:
Lack of formality. Current implementations of byte code veri cation lack formality, in the sense that there is no formal model of what the byte code veri er exactly performs, and what exact properties a successfully veri ed applet actually has. This lack of formality makes it di cult to avoid bugs in a veri er's implementation, as the history of Java bugs clearly demonstrates DFW96, P os98 .
Waste of space on the client's side. The byte code veri er is a program of considerable size, which needs to be installed on the client. This might b e acceptable on a PC, but other Java-enhanced devices like P D As, Java-based phones or Java smart cards have m uch tighter space constraints.
Waste of client's CPU time. The process of byte code veri cation consumes a signi cant amount of CPU time, which is again a problem in PDAs, phones, or smart cards that use comparatively slow processors. Furthermore, the veri er is called each time an applet is loaded, thus resulting in multiple checks of the same byte code. Altogether, we found that the current security architecture of the Java platform has a number of de ciencies, in particular for application areas like J a v a smart cards. On such a card, only a few KBytes are available for the complete Java platform including applications, and it will take at least some years until progress in chip manufacturing will allow for implementing an explicit byte code veri cation on the chip itself. We therefore considered an alternative architecture, where the byte code veri cation proceeds o ine on a server in a network. This also allows to apply a more formal framework for byte code veri cation which can signi cantly strengthen Java security.
O ine Byte Code Veri cation
O ine byte code veri cation is carried out on a server in a network, rather than on the client itself. Successfully veri ed byte code programs are signed with the veri er's digital signature and passed to the client for execution. Note that the veri cation server in the network does not need to check a n applet more than once: it can behave like a proxy server and store results for a while or even check applets in advance. We will rst discuss the general advantages of o ine byte code veri cation, and turn to our particular approach using model checking in Section 4.
O ine byte code veri cation has a number of signi cant advantages: It allows the use of nearly unlimited resources in the process of byte code veri cation, because the resource limitations on a client platform both in time and space are circumvented. O ine veri cation is only limited by the amount of time a user is willing to wait when loading applets. In many application areas it is even acceptable that applets are made known to the veri er before being used, so o ine byte code veri cation may indeed spend several minutes or even hours or days for analysing the byte code of an applet and invest as many resources as are available on a powerful server. In particular, this allows one to use a formal framework for byte code veri cation, like the one we propose in Section 4. O ine byte code veri cation can be customised to special needs without having access to the runtime platform. So far the byte code veri cation in the standard Java e n vironments has come as a xed bundle" of tests applied to the byte code. These tests might o r might not suit the needs of users. For instance, one could think to include approaches like proof-carrying code NL96 o r e v en apply semi-automatic approaches, like a functional veri cation of the byte code.
It saves resources at the client's platform since a client that loads an applet just has to check the digital signature of the incoming code.
It o ers potentially more security than the current architecture: The current architecture depends on veri cation engines that are distributed and individually used. Several bugs in commercial products have shown that it is occasionally necessary to replace these components, which is expensive i n time and money for both the manufacturer and the customer. Further, it is unlikely that all customers are aware of security issues and thus use the latest versions or bug xes. In contrast to this, a central component can easily be replaced as errors show up. Overall security in the network is no longer dened by the weakest client, but depends only on one single well-maintained, well-implemented, well-protected component. We see also some disadvantages of o ine byte code veri cation; in particular: It requires a trusted service in the network since otherwise the result of the veri cation process would be arbitrary. There might be problems with scaleability if such a v eri cation service is implemented naively: If plenty of di erent applets and clients are involved, a v eri cation server might run into performance problems and form a bottleneck for the clients. However, for application areas where only a small number of di erent applets are used, this drawback is negligible, and it vanishes completely if these applets can be made known to the server in advance. Overall, we consider the advantages of o ine byte code veri cation to clearly outweigh its disadvantages for most application areas. In particular, such a n approach allows the integration of formal methods into the process of byte code veri cation, as described in the sequel.
Given a description of a state transition system and a temporal logic formula, a model checker EC82 decides whether the formula holds in the system. This works by completely examining the system's state space, which therefore needs to be nite.
A b yte code program can be viewed as a description of a state transition system performing transitions on states of the JVM. The state space of the JVM is of course potentially in nite, therefore model checking is not directly applicable to such a system, and we need to derive a nite abstraction, rst cf. CGL94 .
On the abstract model, it is possible to check properties which are formulated in a temporal logic like CTL. In such a logic, it is possible to express system properties involving information on states e.g. typing of variables and the system's dynamic behaviour. The properties which are to be checked by the process of byte code veri cation as de ned in LY96 can be expressed in CTL. Thus, by feeding a model checker with the model description and the respective CTL formulas, the model checker acts as a byte code veri er.
Building an Abstract Model
Byte code veri cation is applied to each method separately, therefore only the information relevant to a single method has to be included in the abstract model. Thus, a state of the abstract model essentially consists of a program counter, an operand stack, and the local and instance variables. Additional state variables are added for the bookkeeping of subroutine information and exceptions. References to the constant pool, which contains data used class-wide, can be pre-evaluated as these data items do not change.
Certain instructions can throw exceptions. This means that an exception object is placed on the operand stack and execution continues at a speci c point which is the entry of an exception handler. If no handler is de ned explicitly, a default handler in the JVM is invoked: it takes the exception object from the stack, terminates the current method, returns to the calling method and rethrows the exception there. This recursive procedure ends nally with terminating the program. In contrast, if there exists an explicitly de ned exception handler, execution simply continues with its code. This behaviour is coded into the transition relation, where the default handler is modelled by a transition to the nal state with the exception ag set to true.
Since the properties of the byte code related to its security deal mainly with type safety, the abstract model can be essentially restricted to type information. This allows the abstract model to be nite because a method compiled from a Java program uses only an operand stack o f restricted size, the numb e r o f l o c a l v ariables is nite, there are only nitely many instructions in a method, the numb e r o f t ypes used in a method is nite.
As we w ant the properties checked on the abstracted system to hold also on the original JVM, a homomorphic mapping between the JVM and the abstract model is established. A formal treatment requires, of course, a formal model of the original JVM a concrete model; there are several approaches to achieve this, e.g. Coh96, Qia97 . The mapping ensures the following property:
if ' holds in the abstract model, then it holds also in the concrete one It can be shown that this holds for CTL formulas ' quanti ed over all execution paths see e.g. CGL94 , and we will see that the relevant b yte code properties can be expressed as formulas of that class.
To make the description of the transition system complete, the set of initial states is de ned by setting the state variables to their initial values: the operand stack is empty and the program counter points to the rst instruction; the values of the local variables are determined by the method's signature, which speci es the types of the parameters, the initialization of the remaining state variables is straighforward.
This describes the idea behind constructing a nite state transition system from a byte code program. Since our research is motivated by J a v a smart cards, we will not consider certain features of the Java Virtual Machine JVM which are not supported by J a v a for smart cards see Sun97b for details. This includes multi-dimensional arrays, multi-threading, and dynamic class loading.
Formal Security Properties
The security properties described informally in Section 2.1 have to be formulated in an appropriate logic such as CTL if a model checker is supposed to reason about them. These formul can then be easily validated against the informal description as they are high-level and understandable by h uman readers.
Another way of obtaining the formul is to extract them from a formal description of a defensive JVM. A defensive JVM performs all checks at runtime needed for the secure execution of a program. Such a model of the JVM is partially described in Coh96 . The conditions to be checked by the model checker could be formally derived from such a description.
Most properties are local to a speci c program point. That means: Before an instruction can be safely executed, the state of the JVM has to meet a certain condition. This is expressed by the CTL formula AG pc = n ! where pc denotes the program counter, n a program point the address of an instruction and is a propositional condition on the JVM state. In plain words: Whenever program point n is reached during execution, the condition must hold.
To make sure that a local variable i contains a value of a speci c type T, is of the form loc i = T loc is the array of local variables. The formul for checking the size and typing of the operand stack are similar.
Some 5 Example: A Simple Electronic Purse
As an example for performing byte code veri cation through a model checker, we consider the method debit of class Purse see gure 4, implementing a simple electronic purse running on a Java smart card; this example was implemented for the Cyber ex Java Smart Card Sch97 . The method debit is invoked on a Purse object whenever money is withdrawn. debit takes the amount of money as an argument and returns true if the transaction was successful and false in case the value stored in the purse would become negative. In the latter case, a method for notifying the bank is invoked. In any case, the transaction counter is incremented. The respective code is enclosed in a finally clause, so it is performed even if an exception is raised from calling notifyBank.
We rst take a look at the state transition system built from the compiled method debit and how it re ects the semantics of the byte code instructions. Then we consider the formul describing the properties established during byte code veri cation. Figure 4 shows the compiled method debit as created by j a v ac from Javasoft. From this piece of byte code, a state transition system is built and given to a model checker, together with conditions to check. Figure 5 shows the corresponding input for the model checker SMV. This description was created manually, but it can be easily computed automatically with an appropriate tool.
A T ransition System for debit
A state of the transition system consists of the following state variables: a program counter pc ranging over the instruction addresses and an additional nal state; an operand stack, implemented by a stack pointer sp and stack locations st0 through st2 the maximum height of the stack is 3 as recorded in the class le; local variables loc0 through loc4; a stack for active subroutines rstack; an exception ag which indicates whether the method ends because of an exception; object variables field7 and field9. Other state types are possible, and it is desirable to restrict the state space as much as possible. A candidate for a more e cient representation is the operand stack. Here, the currently unused stack locations unnecessarily expand the state space.
Some simpli cations were made for building the model: The only primitive data ty p e i s i n teger booleans are treated as integers, and no other primitive types are used in the program. Furthermore, the access conditions for object variables elds and methods which could be violated by the getfield, putfield and invokevirtual instructions are not handled.
The types for stack locations and local variables are similar: They range over a set of reference values null, this, exception, and arbitrary reference, a primitive t ype integer and return addresses used by the ret instruction. The additional value UNDEF for local variables indicates that a variable has not yet been initialised and therefore cannot be used.
The object variables are of type integer. They are strictly typed and may not hold arbitrary values like local variables do.
Note that the stack pointer ranges over values from 0 to 4, where 4 stands for invalid". The formul describing the transitions are partial in the sense that for invalid values, the value of sp in the next state is not determined. This leads to the existence of execution paths, where sp h a s a v alue of 4. H o w ever, by the speci cation SPEC AG !sp=4 we can assure that these paths are not reachable and therefore the stack never exceeds its maximum or minimum size.
Initial state In the initial state, the stack is empty and the program counter points to the rst instruction of the program. The local variable 0 contains the reference to the object for which the method was called. loc1 holds the method parameter which i s a n i n teger value. The other local variables are marked UNDEF and are therefore unusable for any reading instruction. There are no active subroutines, no exception has been raised, and the object variables are assumed to contain valid values see the INIT lines in Figure 5 .
State transitions The transitions are described by formul using the variable values of the current and the following states. The description re ects the structure of the byte code program. Generally, the actual transition formula is guarded by a formula pc=Lnn, indicating that this transition should be made when program point Lnn is reached see the TRANS statements in Figure 5 .
A transition manipulates the stack, changes some variables or raises an exception. This is expressed by describing which v alues the state variables will have in the next state, depending on their values in the current state. It must be stated explicitly if state variables do not change their values. Otherwise, the model checker chooses an arbitrary value as for unused stack locations.
Exception handling The Java method considered here performs no explicit exception handling, i.e.: all exceptions raised while executing the method are handed over to the caller of the method. However, the finally clause must be executed even if an exception occurs. Therefore the compiler added an exception handler ranging from address 36 to 41 in Figure 4 which calls the finally clause and then re-throws the exception, i.e. hands it upwards.
The instructions in our example which could possibly raise exceptions are invokevirtual, getfield and putfield. There are several getfield instructions in the method which raise exceptions if their respective object reference is null. As an example, look at the instruction at address 1 which i s c o v ered by the exception handler, so in case of a null reference a jump to the code of the exception handler is performed. Thus, for address 1 the model description includes a transition to address 36 guarded by the appropriate condition.
In contrast, if the instruction at address 46 raises an exception, the method is immediately interrupted and control is returned to the caller of the method. This is re ected in the abstracted model description by a transition to the nal state with the exception ag set. We do not model the transfer of control here, as we consider only one method at a time.
Subroutine calls There is one subroutine in the method, implementing the code enclosed in the finally clause. This code can be called from 3 di erent locations the jsr instructions at addresses 14, 31, 37. Although not obvious, the variable rstack holds a stack where labels for all active subroutines are pushed on. As we h a v e only one here, there are two possible values for rstack: EMPTY if the subroutine is not active and JSR42 in the other case. The label JSR42 indicates that the subroutine starts at address 42.
Whenever a jsr instruction is executed, the subroutine must not already be active, as the Java b yte code speci cation forbids recursive calls to subroutines. Therefore, the condition rstack=EMPTY has to be true for each program point with a jsr instruction.
Byte Code Properties
The properties sketched below describe the type safety of the program. They ensure that all operations have operands of suitable types, and that there are no stack under ows or over ows. They also ensure that subroutines are not recursively called. 
Related Work
The principle of o ine byte code veri cation has, to our knowlege, rst been described within the context of the Kimera project SGB98 ; the separation was proposed mainly for reasons of e ciency. The project also addresses the security of Java runtime environments, by providing a more carefully tested and cleaner" implementation of the byte code veri er. Kimera does not attempt to put the veri cation step on rigorous approaches like formal methods.
Closely related work towards a formal treatment o f J a v a is currently being undertaken at several places: Attempts to de ne a formal semantics for subsets of the Java language are pursued by NvO98, DE97, Sym97 ; this work chie y aims at proving that the Java t ype system is sound and uses type-theoretic approaches. These approaches do not consider Java b yte code and are therefore not directly applicable to our approach.
An approach to formally de ne the semantics of the complete Java language using Abstract State Machines is described in BS98 . Their formulation de nes the mapping from the Java language to Java b yte code in several layers of abstraction. This work is related to our approach since ASM can be seen as state transition systems. Although BS98 do not consider proving properties of concrete byte code programs, the results could eventually contribute to mapping byte code programs into the nite abstractions used in our approach.
A de nition of the semantics of the Java Virtual Machine is described in Qia97 . The approach considers a subset of the JVM instructions and aims at proving the run-time type correctness of byte code programs from their static typing. It yields an operational semantics of Java b yte code and a static type inference system.
A similar approach i s t a k en in SA98 ; the paper concentrates on the try finally construct in the Java language and the Java b yte code instructions relevant to this. The di erence to our approach is that SA98 uses a language more expressive than the nite state systems we consider; therefore, a more detailed description of the semantics of byte code veri cation is possible, at the price of a more complex modelling. The approach g o e s i n to a very similar direction to our work, but it concentrates on describing the byte code veri cation, whilst we focus on carrying it out with declarative means.
Our approach di ers on the meta level from proof carrying NL96, FL97 code in that we replace the process of checking the proof by v erifying a digital signature. Rather than requiring a proof checker on the client side, we assume safe distribution of keys, trust in a network node and signature veri cation on the client side. However, it is foreseeable that a public key infrastructure will be widely available in the future, so very little additional overhead is brought into the client b y our procedure. Technically, w e use a less expressive because decidable language for expressing properties than proof carrying code. This allows us to perform proofs fully automatically, while with proof carrying code, the question of where the proofs actually come from, still needs to be sorted out in detail.
Conclusion
We described an approach t o J a v a b yte code veri cation, where the veri er is not integrated into the Java run time environment, but proceeds o ine. The process is implemented by using a model checker on an explicit, nite model of a b yte code program. The checker veri es that the required security conditions, which are also given explicitly, hold for that model and are therefore ful lled by the original byte code program.
The proposed method of formal byte code veri cation helps achieving the highest level of security in execution of Java applets. This is done by replacing a crucial part of the Java security architecture, the byte code veri er, by a tool based on formal methods that avoids the pitfalls of conventional implementations.
To summarise, the advantages of our approach are:
More exibility and extensibility. In the sketched framework, we deal with high-level descriptions of system models and safety properties. The described abstract model of the JVM is not the only one possible, and the model and the properties to be checked can be adapted to individual needs.
Achieving formal correctness. The highest achievable level of correctness is a formal proof. The correctness of an implementation of the byte code veri er is almost impossible to prove, and the bene t is questionable, as a little change invalidates the whole proof.
In our approach, we shift the proof condition from the implementation level to the level of validation, of both the model description and the formul . But as these descriptions are high-level, the task becomes relatively easy. Furthermore, as errors show up, they can be corrected quickly and safely. Of course, there is still no guarantee that an actual implementation of a JVM will execute a veri ed byte code program correctly. T o a c hieve this, we need a formally veri ed implementation of the JVM and the whole environment. For smart cards, even this task seems tractable.
We believe that through model checking, a formal treatment o f b yte code can be achieved in a simple and e ective w a y . Understanding the formalisms needed for this kind of byte code veri cation is not more complicated than implementing a b yte code veri er, and the gain is a formal, highly trustable veri er. 
